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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STEVEN M. ESERNIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OVERLAND MOVING CO·MP ANY, a 
corporation, and THOMAS C. JONES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
I 
CASE N·O. 
719'5 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACiTS 
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts set forth 
in Appellant's brief, except in the following particulars: 
1. It is stated by Appellant that the evidence is not 
entirely clear as to whether the driver of the van stated to 
Esernia that he was sleepy and wanted someone to keep him 
company so he wouldn't fall asleep before Esernia entered 
the van or after the journey had started. The record shows 
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that Esernia stated that the driver of the van told him be-
fore he got in the truck that he (the driver) "was tired" 
and '''wanted somebody to keep him company on the road, 
so he wouldn't fall asleep." .(R. 122·-123.) 
"Q. And you and your buddy, called Meredith, 
were standing in front of the hamburger stand and 
you were talking to some girls? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And the truck driver drove up and stopped 
and asked you if you were going to Salt Lake? 
"A. He asked us if we wanted a ride to Salt 
Lake. 
"Q. Is that all he said to you at that time? 
"A. Well, we argued a little bit. I did not want 
to go. One of us dia not want to go, I believe it was 
Meredith wanted to go. I wanted to stay there with 
the girls. He wanted to go. The driver said, then, 
he wanted some company. 
"Q. Did he say why he wanted some company? 
"A. He was kind of weary. 
"Q. He said he was kind of weary? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Did he say anything else about being weary 
at that time? 
"A. I don't believe so. 
"Q. Did he say why he wanted you to go with 
him? 
"A. He wanted us to talk to him, he wanted 
company. 
"Q. Why did he want you to talk to him? 
"A. He wanted company, something to do, be-
sides driving, I suppose. 
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"Q. Did he tell you why he wanted company? 
MR. THURMAN : You are now talking 
about in Elko? 
MR. JONE8 : In Elko. 
"A. Well, I don't know if it was right there on 
the spot, or after we got in the truck, but a little 
while after we did get in the truck, and he told us he 
was tired and he wanted somebody to talk to. 
"Q. Your deposition was taken, was it not, in 
Connecticut? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. I am goin to read to you your answer to 
the same question. 
. " 'Q. How did he happen to pick you up? 
"· 'A. We were standing there talking to 
the girls. We were going to stay with the girls 
that night. This driver pulled up alongside of 
us. He stopped his truck and he asked us if 
we wanted a ride, and we told him we were 
going to stay in that town. We sort of figured 
if we went all the way to Salt Lake we would 
not be able to get back in time. He told us he 
was tired, he wanted somebody to keep him 
company on the road, so he wouldn't fall asleep 
and he asked us if we would not go with him. 
" 'Well, the fellow I was with wanted to 
go to Salt Lake and I wanted to stay around 
with the girls. We argued a little while, and 
the truck driver wanted lls to go with him, so 
we went.' 
Was that your answer to that question? 
"A. Yes, I believe it was,-
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"Q. Was that what happened? 
"A. Well, I don't know word for word, but that 
is about the same thing. 
"Q. Did he, at any time, after you started on 
the road from Elko to Salt Lake, again tell you that 
he was tired and sleepy? 
"A. Yes sir. 
I 
"Q. How long was that after you got into the 
truck? 
"A. I- don't know that, I don't know how long. 
"Q. Well, did he tell you how far he had driven 
without sleep or rest? 
''A. He told us he came from San Francisco, 
California. 
"Q. Did he tell you he had come from San Fran-
cisco without any sleep or rest? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And he had been driving all the time? 
"A. Yes sir." (R. 121-122.-12·3-.) 
Later in the trial of the case, Esernia testified as fol-· 
lows: 
"Q. He told you he was tired and sleepy at the 
time he picked you up; is that correct? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Then he told you he was tired and sleepy 
about two hours afterward; is that correct? 
"A. I think he told us he was tired and sleepy 
after that first time he went on the shoulder, that 
was,about, maybe two or three hours afterwards. 
"Q. He did tell you he was tired and sleepy be-
fore you got on the fruck? 
"A. I don't know if we were in the truck or 
getting in the truck. I know it was in Elko there. 
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'~Q. Before you started on the trip, at any rate? 
"A. Yes sir." (R. 142-143.) 
2. The Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's 
brief fails to set forth the fact that Esernia did not at any 
time after entering the van request permission to leave it. 
The testimony of Esernia·· shows that after he entered the 
van, the driver several times stated that he was sleepy and 
tired, and that he, Esernia, or Meredith would have to keep 
talking to the driver in order to keep him awake. (R. 124, 
143, 82.) The testimony of Esernia also shows that some-
time after the van left Elko it went off the road and bounced 
along the shoulder of the highway, and that the driver of 
the van stated that "he had dozed off". ( R. 86, 124.) The 
record shows that neither Esernia or Meredith made any 
request for permission to leave the van. (R. 13:2, 145.) 
3. The Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's 
brief fails to set forth the fact that Esernia had ample op-
portunity to leave the van, had he desired so to do. The rec-
ord shows that after the van left Elko and before the acci-
dent happened, it stopped at Wendover and at Delle, Utah. 
( R. 154-155.) Ese.rnia testified that he remembered a couple 
of little towns between Elko and the place of the accident. 
(R. 125.) The driver of the van testified (and his testimony 
was in no way refuted) that the van stopped at Wendover 
for about an hour. ( R. 154.) He testified that he stopped 
at Delle long enough to have a piece of pie and a cup of 
coffee. ( R. 155.) 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor 
of the respondents. 
1. It is argued by Appellant that there was sufficient 
evidence in this case to require the trial court to submit to 
the jury the question as to whether or not the defendants 
were guilty of "willful misconduct". Whether the defendants 
were or were not guilty of willful misconduct within the 
meaning of those words as they are used in Section 57-11-7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, becomes immaterial in this ap-
peal, because the evidence in the record clearly shows that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and that 
he assumed the risk as a matter of law. 
2. The evidence shoU?s that plaintiff, as a matter of 
law, was guilty of contributory negligence and that he as-
sumed the risk barring his right of recovery from the defen-
dants. 
The testimony of the plaintiff shows : 
( 1) Before or at the time he entered the van, the 
driver told plaintiff that he was tired and sleepy and wanted 
someone to k~ep him company on the road so that he wouldn't 
fall asleep. (R. 122-123.) ; 
(2) After the van left Elko the driver told plaintiff 
that he had driven from San Francisco, ·califQrnia, without 
sleep or rest. ( R. 123.) ; 
(3) After the van left Elko, the driver told the plain-
tiff and Meredith, the other "guest" in the van, that one of 
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them could go to sleep, but one would have to stay awake 
talking to him to keep him a wake. ( R. 124.) ; 
( 4) About one hour, or about four hours, after they 
left Elko, the driver dozed, ran off the road onto the shoulder 
and stated to plaintiff and to Meredith that he had dozed 
and stated that he wanted them to keep talking to him to 
keep him a wake. ( R. 86, 124.) ; 
( 5) Plaintiff did not at any time request permission· 
to leave the van. (R. 145.) ; 
(6) The van passed through a couple of little towns 
before the accident happened, and plaintiff did not request 
permission to leave the van. (R. 125.) The driver of the 
van stated that he stopped at Wendover for one hour and for 
a short time at Delle, which towns are between Elko. and the 
place of the accident. (R. 154-155.) 
Prior to the adoption ofthe Guest statute by the State 
of Utah, this court decided the case of Maybee vs. Maybee, 
79 Utah 585, 11 P. (2d) 973. In that case the plaintiff 
sought to recover damages against the defendant, her 
mother, for personal injuries sustained by her when tne 
automobile driven by her mother an~ in which she was rid-
ing as a guest hit a chuck hole and overturned. The mother 
was near sighted and had always worn glasses when drivi~g. 
The daughter had known for many years that the- mother 
was near sighted and that she had to wear glasses. At the 
time the accident occurred, the mother was not wearing her 
glasses and had been driving without them for three or four 
hours. At the time of the accident, f'laintiff was riding in 
the front seat reading a book. Plaintiff had asked her mother 
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once or twice whether she was getting along all right with-
out her glasses and the mother replied that she was. The 
mother testified that she could have seen the chuck hole had 
she been wearing her glasses. This. court in that case sus-
tained a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In its 
decision the court (page 975) stated: 
"It is not disputed that every fact circumstance, 
and condition relied on by the plaintiff as constituting 
negligence on the part of the defendant was fully 
known to and appreciated by plaintiff, and that, not-
withstanding her knowledge of the fact that she was 
driving without the aid of glasses, the plaintiff paid 
no attention to the conditions in the road, but was 
content to sit by and read a book while her mother 
was driving at a speed of forty to forty-five miles an 
hour. If it was negligence for the defendant to drive 
at this speed with her vision impaired as it was, and 
without the aid of glasses, it ~ould follow that, where 
all these facts are fully known to and appreciated by 
the plaintiff, and notwithstanding such facts and 
such knowledge she was willing to be driven in the 
car, she not only assumed the risk or hazard to her 
own safety, which resulted from such driving, but, 
by her acquiescence, was guilty of independent negli-
gence which contributed. to the accident. The plain-
tiff identified herself with whatever negligence there 
was on the ·part of the mother because of her knowl-
edge. of all such facts and her approval, consent, and 
acquiescence in the driving of the car by her mother. 
* * * Because- of her acquiescence and consent 
to be driven under these circumstances, she herself 
participated in the negligence which caused the in-
jury, and she is therefore barred from recovery." 
This court in that case cited the case of Krueger vs. 
Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 22·2 N. W. 784, stating: 
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"In Krueger v. Krueger, supra, it was held that 
the plaintiff, ~he mother of defendant, could notre-
cover where the negligence relied on was the sleepy 
condition of the driver 'who had driven a long dis-
tance and was without sleep the night before, because 
the plaintiff had full knowledge of the condition of 
the driver and was bound to know, as a matter of 
common knowledge, what might result from the de-
fendant dozing while at the wheel. Ordinarily a guest 
may not continue to ride in the car without protest 
against recklessness or negligence of the driver in 
charge of the car, thereby assuming the risk and par-
ticipating in the negligence, and then claim that he· 
was without fault." 
In the case of Markovich vs. Schlafke, et al., 284 N. W. 
516, it was held that a guest who knew that the driver had 
been up all night, and had been indulging in intoxicating 
liquors, and who observed the drowsiness of driver, but per-
mitted driver to remain at wheel, assumed risk of injury 
sustained when driver fell asleep and automobile ran .into 
ditch. In that case the court said : 
"It thus clearly appears from the plaintiff's own 
testimony that- he noticed that ~schlafke went to sleep 
a little two or three times on the trip; that because he 
observed Schlafke was sleepy he made him stop at the 
intersection of county trunk E with highway No. 55 
and wanted to drive the car himself; but after being 
assured by the defendant that the latter knew what 
he was doing he rode on with Schlafke still at the 
wheel, a distance of about a half mile when Schlafke 
again went to sleep and lost control of his car. 
"These facts testified to by the plaintiff himself 
made out about as clear a case of assumption of risk 
by a guest as may well be found. In Knipfer v. Shaw, 
210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, 330, 247 N·. W. 320, we 
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reviewed. a number of our prior cases in each of 
which it had been held that the guest had assumed 
the risk. We said : 'In all of those cases three ele-
ments were ·present: (1) A hazard or danger incon-
sistent with the safety of the guest; (2) knowledge 
and appreciation of the hazard by the guest; and (3) 
acquiescence or a willingness to proceed in the face 
of the danger.' 
"In every case where those elements have un-
questionably existed we have applied our doctrine of 
assumption of risk and consistently denied recovery 
from the host by a gratuitous guest riding in the form-
er's automobile. * * * Under the circumstances 
of this case it clearly appears that for some time prior 
to the accident a hazard or danger wholly inconsist-
ent with the safety of the plaintiff existed; that the 
plaintiff had full knowledge and appreciation of that 
hazard and acquiesced or willingly continued to ride 
with the defendant notwithstanding such hazard or 
danger. The undisputed facts of this case more 
strongly impel the conclusion that the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk than do the facts in Krueger v. 
Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784, 785, where a 
guest sought to recover from her host because the 
latter went to sleep while operating his automobile." 
The case of Rennolds' Adm'x vs. Waggoner, 271 Ky. 
300, 111 S. W. (2d) 647, involved these facts: The defen-
dant and Rennolds with others attended a dance about 40 
miles from their home. About midnight during intermission 
they had lunch and some liquor but the evidence showed that 
none of them were ·intoxicated. During that intermission 
and when they were starting home, there was a discussion 
about how hard they had worked the day before and how 
tired and sleepy they were. On the return trip Rennolds 
drove the car for about 20 miles. When they stopped and 
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had a drink from a spring, Rennolds complained of being 
sleepy and asked Waggoner to drive. Waggoner was also 
tired and sleepy and when they got back into the automobile 
he cautioned the others that he was sleepy and requested 
that they remain awake and talk to him to keep him from 
going to sleep. Shortly after leaving the spring, all of the 
occupants of the car went to sleep. Within three miles of 
their. home Waggoner 'vent to sleep, the automobile ran off 
the road, overturned, and Rennolds was killed. The court 
in that case held that the deceased Rennolds had known that 
Waggoner was in a state of drowsiness and fatigu~ and when 
he entered the automobile under those circumstances he as-
sumed the risk of injury resulting from such causes. 
Appellant's brief cites the case of Freedman vs. Hur-
witz, 164 Atlantic 647 ('Conn. 19"313) in support of the·argu-
ment that the appellant was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence or assumption of risk. The facts in that case differ ma-
terially from the facts established by the record in this case. 
There, as appears from the opinion of the court, it was not 
shown that the plaintiffs knew the defendant was tired and 
sleepy at the time they entered the automobile as guests, it 
was not until a few minutes before the accident happened 
that plaintiffs knew the defendant was tired and sleepy. In 
that case the plaintiffs had no opportunity to leave the car 
after they knew the driver's condition before the accident 
occurred. 
The court, at page 649, stated: 
"The plaintiffs are a young girl about fifteen 
years old at the time of the accident and a woman then 
about sixty. They were ·riding as guests of the de-
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fendant in the rear seat of his automobile. It is true 
that the jury could have reasonably found that each 
knew that the defendant was tired and sleepy and 
that· he realized he might fall asleep while driving 
the car, yet thereafter, without remonstrance or ef-
fort to guard themselves from danger, they continued 
to ride in it for a few minute~-just how long the 
record does not disclose." · 
The court, in that case, in discussing the defense of as-
sumption of risk, (page 649), stated: 
"And the doctrine can only apply where the par-
ticular situation or condition producing the risk has 
continued for such a length of time that the party 
alleged to have assumed it can be found to have known 
it or been charged with knowledge of it, to have ap-
preciated the risk to which he was subjected by it, 
either actually or because he ought reasonably to 
have done so, and to have had an opportunity to avoid 
it." 
The facts in our case fit squarely with all of the condi-
tions stated by that court as being required in order to apply 
the defense of assumption of risk. 
Cited in Appellant's brief is the case of Erickson vs. 
V ogt, 80 Pac. 2d 535. In that case the court, in discussing 
the facts, ~t page 536, stated: 
- "While it is true that in the instant case the 
parties had both been drinking during the time they 
were at the dance hall, and had the case been sub-
mitted to the jury it might have fo~nd respondent to 
have been so far intoxicated as to affect the safety of 
his driving, either by making him drowsy or other-
wise, still the evidence does not indicate that his ap-
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pearance was such as necessarily to warn appellant 
of his inability properly to drive. So far as appears, 
she may have had no reasons for real apprehension, 
at least until he fell into the doze and grazed the curb, 
and may not, even then, be chargeable with fully re-
alizing her danger or being· in any position to have 
avoided it." 
The facts in our case go far beyond the facts in that 
case. In our case the plaintiff testified that the driver of 
the van told him that he was tired and sleepy and that he 
wanted the plaintiff and his buddy to ride with him to keep 
him awake. Under those circumstances the plaintiff could 
have refused to ride or he could have left the van at Wen-
dover or. at Delle. 
In Appellant's brief is cited the case of Smith vs. Wil-
liams, 178 P. (2d) 710. In that case it was held that the 
fact that the guest was asleep at the time the driver was 
overcome by sleep did not, as a matter of law, bar the guest's 
right to recover. It clearly appears from the opinion in that 
case that the guest did not know that the driver was sleepy 
at the time the guest went to sleep. 
In our case there can be no dispute as to the plaintiff's 
knowledge of the condition of the driver because the plaintiff 
testified that before he got into the van the driver told him 
that he was tired and wanted plaintiff to ride with him to 
keep him awake. 
The acts and conduct of the defendants, which are al-
leged and relied upon by plaintiff as constituting willful 
misconduct are set forth in Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's 
amended complaint: 
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''That said carelessness, recklessness and willful 
misconduct consisted of the following: That the indi-
vidual defendant, within the hour preceding the acci-
dent hereinafter set out, and while driving said 
truck, fell asleep, and thereafter and to and includ-
ing the time of said accident, was sleepy and tired, 
and was in an unfit mental and physical condition to 
drive and operate said truck on said highway, in this, 
that he had driven and operated said truck without 
relief or sleep, or without rest, for a distance of more 
than 600 miles; that the individual defendant knew 
of his said mental and physical condition, and knew 
that the continued driving and operation of said 
truck while in said condition, would be accompanied 
with extreme and probable danger to all persons rid-
ing therein, including plaintiff; that notwithstanding 
his said condition and said knowledge, the individual 
defendant, carelessly, recklessly and with willful mis-
conduct continued to drive and operate said truck, 
with plaintiff as a guest passenger aforesaid, and 
that upon reaching said point approximately one-
fourth of a mile east of said Lake Point Service Sta-
tion, the individual defendant again fell asleep, and, 
as a result of his so doing, said truck left said high-
way, went out of control, -travelled off said highway 
for a distance of 600 feet~ and turned over three 
times.'' 
The testimony of plaintiff shows that every act and 
circumstance relied upon ~s constituting willf~l misconduct 
on the part of the driver was known to plaintiff and acquies-
ced in by him, and that he accepted the ride and continued 
to ride notwithstanding the fact that he had ample oppor-
tunity to refuse to ride and to leave the van before the acci-
dent happened. 
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... 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAW,LINS & JONE,S, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
--:. 
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